







Institute of Economic Theory
Abstract
In this paper a formulation of dynamic non-linear programs
as mixed complementarity problems (mcp) is shown.
Models of exhaustible resource markets are used to
describe the transformation. Once the mixed
complementarity formulation is developed, the
implementation in GAMS is described in detail. 
Introduction
Modelling languages such as GAMS1 (General Algebraic
Modelling System) and AMPL2 (A Modelling Language for
Mathematical Programming) are becoming more and more
important in applied economics.3 As a result of the ease
with which they can represent and solve mathematical
expressions, they have become a very powerful tool of
economic modellers. The handling of a great amount of
data is made comfortable, and therefore economic
modellers are in a position to concentrate on the model
itself instead of developing suitable solution algorithms.4
By using mixed complementarity problem (mcp)
formulations, many special cases of mathematical problems
can be solved, such as linear and non-linear equations,
linear and non-linear complementarity problems, and linear
and non-linear programs, where the latter is used to derive
the optimal price and extraction path of a non-renewable
natural resource. The main advantage of an mcp
formulation lies in its ﬂexibility and speed solving complex
economic models, which results from the fact that ﬁrst-order
conditions are used to set up the models. With the excellent
exceptions of Rutherford (1995) and Ferris/Munson (2000)
on static examples of mcp, literature on formulating
economic problems as non-linear complementarity
problems is rare. Usually, the presentation of
complementarity problems is done without describing the
economic content of the underlying problem.5
The goal of this paper is to give an overview of the
formulation of complementarity problems and to show
their concrete implementation in GAMS by modelling
well-known dynamic problems of non-renewable resources
theory. The paper addresses economists with a basic
training in GAMS and control theory, who are interested in
making use of the powerful tool of mcp algorithms. To
alleviate access to the problem, the next section describes
and explains the general formulation of complementarity
problems and ends with an illustration of a non-linear
program as an mcp. The third section recalls the basic
theory of non-renewable resources on the assumption of
three different market structures: perfect competition,
monopoly and Nash–Cournot oligopoly. The
implementation of mixed complementarity problems in
GAMS is shown in the fourth section. 
Mixed complementarity problems
The general mathematical formulation of mixed
complementarity problems is as follows:
Given a function F :RN→ RN and the bounds I,u∈ RN,
ﬁnd z,w,v ∈ RN
that meet the following conditions:
F(z) = w – v (0.1)
I ≤  z ≤  u, w ≥  0, v ≥  0 (0.2)
(z – I)T ⋅  w = 0 (0.3)
(u – z)T ⋅  v = 0 (0.4)
with – ∞ ≤ / ≤  z ≤  u ≤ ∞ (0.5)
The superscript T refers to the transposition of a matrix or a
vector. To illustrate the formulation above, it makes sense to
recall the derivation of the Kuhn–Tucker conditions.6
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Maximise f(z) (0.6)
s.t. z ≥  0
where the function f is assumed to be differentiable. 
This is an optimization problem with one inequality
constraint; the variable z is lower bounded at 0. Now there
are three possibilities for a local maximum of the function
f(z) subject to z ≥  0 . First, a local maximum can be an
interior solution at point A in diagram (a) of Figure 1. The
resulting ﬁrst-order condition is well known: f’(z) = 0.
Second, a local maximum can also occur at point B in
diagram (b) at the lower bound of z, where z=0. Even in
this case the ﬁrst-order condition f’(z) = 0 is still valid. Third,
a local maximum is shown in diagram (c). Again the local
maximum is at the lower bound z =0but in this case we
obtain f’(z) < 0. 
Thus one of the following conditions must hold to
determine a local maximum of (0.6):
f’(z) = 0 and z > 0
f’(z) = 0 and z = 0 (0.7)
f’(z) < 0 and z = 0
These conditions can be combined to the following
statement:
f’(z) ≤  0, z ≥  0, z ⋅ f’(z) = 0 (0.8)
What does condition (0.8) mean for the formulations in
(0.1)–(0.4)? If z is at its lower bound l, i.e. z =l(in (0.7)
z =0 ), F(z) =0or F(z) <0holds. It follows that either w =0
and thus F(z) =0or w >0and thus F(z) <0 . If z is neither at
its lower bound nor at its upper bound (in (0.7) z >0 ), 
i.e. z ≠  l,u, because of (0.3) and (0.4) w,v =0holds and
consequently we obtain F(z) =0(f’(z) = 0 and z > 0 in (0.7)).
Similar considerations hold for an upper bound on z and as
a consequence, we obtain equations (0.1)–(0.4) that
combine all possible combinations. 
Now it is possible to state a non-linear program as a





x ∈  X :={x|g(x)≤ 0, x ≥  0}
with x ∈ Rn and f : Rn → Rm as well as g : Rn →  Rm representing
continuous differentiable functions. The resulting necessary
ﬁrst-order conditions are:
∇ f(x) + y ⋅ ∇ g(x) ≥  0, x ≥  0, ⊥ (0.9)
–g(x) ≥  0, y ≥  0, ⊥
The sign ⊥ means that the inner product of two matrices or
vectors is 0 (they are orthogonal) so that the following
condition holds: xT ⋅  [∇ f(x) + y ⋅ ∇ g(x)] = 0
Condition (0.9) can be restated in the mcp format of
(0.1)–(0.4):
(0.10)
Now vector z has a lower bound at l =0 . As there is no
upper bound on z, according to (0.4) v =0must be valid. If z
is not at its lower bound  (z >0 ), w =0must also be valid.
But if z =0 , w is not determined and can be larger than 0 as
well as equal to 0. w =0is the representation of point B in
Figure 1 and w >0the representation of point C.
In a literal sense, (0.10) is not a mixed complementarity
problem, but a pure complementarity problem. If the lower
bound of variable x is relaxed so that no explicit lower
bound is valid, we get from (0.9):
∇ f(x) + y ⋅ ∇ g(x) = 0, x free, ⊥ (0.11)
–g(x) ≥  0, y ≥  0, ⊥
The resulting mixed complementarity problem is as
follows:
(0.12)
In this case x is unbounded. From (0.3) and (0.4) we get
w,v >0and therefore from (0.1) follows F(x) =0(point A in
Figure 1). Further illustrations of special cases represented
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Figure 1. Graphical depiction of Kuhn–Tucker conditions
Source: Chiang (1984), p. 723.by mixed complementarity problems can be found in
Rutherford (1995), Dirkse and Ferris (1994) and Ferris and
Munson (2000).
Models of exhaustible natural 
resource markets
The most simpliﬁed model of an exhaustible natural
resource market describes a market for an exhaustible
resource which is supplied by a large number of producers
n.7 This is the well-known perfect competition case.
Producers compete with each other so that none of them is
able to inﬂuence the market price pt by a variation of his
production quantities. At time t =0each producer owns a
given and known resource stock with S
i(0) = S
i
0 where i =
1,...,n representing the number of producers. Let R
i
t be the
quantities extracted by producer i at time t and let there be
identical but constant marginal extraction costs dC(Rt)/dRt = c
≥ 0 so that there are no stock-related extraction costs. The
producers are faced with a linear demand function of type
Dt = a – b ⋅ pt (0.13)
whereas Dt represents demand for the resource at time t. In
equilibrium the following condition has to hold:
Dt = Rt = Σ Rit ∀ t (0.14)
i
With a positive discount rate r the maximization problem










t ≥ 0 (0.17)
R
i
t ≥ 0 (0.18)





The subscript i will be ignored in the following
considerations, because all producers are assumed to be
identical and only the industry outcome is analysed. To
calculate the individual extraction paths, total quantity at
time t has to be divided by the number of producers n. 
The present value Hamiltonian for the maximization
problem (0.15)–(0.18) is:
Ht = (pt – c) ⋅  Rt – λ t ⋅ Rt (0.20)




Solving (0.13) for pt and substituting in (0.21) leads under
consideration of (0.14) to 
(0.24)
Equations (0.24), (0.22) and (0.23) are the ﬁrst-order
conditions for the optimization problem (0.15)–(0.19). It
can be restated as a mixed complementarity problem of the
form (0.1)–(0.4):
(0.25)
The second model to be analysed is the monopoly case
with n =1 . In contrast to the case of the competitively
organised market, the monopolist has an inﬂuence on the
market price through a variation of the quantities extracted.
Equation (0.15) changes into:
(0.26)
Now the market price depends on the extraction quantities
of the monopolist. The demand function (0.13) can be
directly substituted in (0.26), so that the resulting
Hamiltonian looks as follows:
(0.27)
The ﬁrst-order conditions (0.22) and (0.23) remain
unchanged, but (0.24) has to be altered:
(0.28)
This completes the ﬁrst-order conditions of the monopoly
case. 
Now consider an oligopolistic market with only a few
(minimum two) producers (players). Each player is aware
not only of his own inﬂuence on the market price, but of
the fact that the quantities of all other players have an
inﬂuence, too. An open-loop Nash–Cournot equilibrium is
reached if all players take the quantities of all the other
players as given and optimize their own extraction paths
with respect to these quantities.9 When an open-loop
Nash–Cournot equilibrium is reached, no player has an
incentive to deviate from the chosen path, because all
players give reciprocally best answers to the other’s
strategies. An open-loop strategy characterises a
single-staged decision process, i.e. each player chooses all
actions at the beginning of the game independently of the
actual evolution of the game. The players make binding
agreements at the beginning of the game over the actions
during the game. This may cause problems concerning the
time consistency of the game, because a strategy chosen at
the beginning of the game may prove itself suboptimal
during the game. As a result of this, the players may have
incentives to deviate from their original strategies.10
Consider a single producer i at time t =0holding a given
and known stock of resource Si (0) = S
i
0 with i = 1,...,n.
Extracted quantities of player i at time t are R
i
t and the linear
demand function (0.13), as well as equation (0.14), is valid.
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marginal extraction costs ci. The optimization problem can






Substituting (0.13) in (0.29) with regard to (0.14) yields
(0.33)
The resulting present value Hamiltonian is:
(0.34)




In contrast to (0.28), condition (0.35) is now not only
dependent on the quantities of player i but in addition on
the quantities of all players Rt. Figure 2 recapitulates the
ﬁrst-order conditions of the three market structures
considered in this chapter.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are necessary to derive optimal
price and extraction paths by using the mixed
complementarity formulation. They correspond to the
function f(z) in equations (0.1), (0.10) and (0.12)
respectively. But now vector z comprises the variables 
R, S, and λ . The next section shows the implementation 
in GAMS. 
Implementation in GAMS
The GAMS code for the mcp formulation of the
competition case is shown in Figure 3.11 First of all, the
necessary sets, parameters and scalars are deﬁned. It is
important to notice that the price is deﬁned not as a
variable, but as a parameter. This is because the ﬁrst-order
conditions (0.22)–(0.24) do not comprise the price
explicitly. Therefore the price path has to be calculated
separately.12 Subsequently the deﬁnition of variables
follows: R(t) and S(t) are positively deﬁned (or lower
bounded), i.e. R(t),S(t)≥ 0; l(t) is deﬁned as an
unbounded variable. The functions deﬁned by
Prof(t).., MoveS(t).. and MoveL(t).. reproduce
the ﬁrst-order conditions of (0.22)–(0.24). The ‘Model’
statement assigns equations to their corresponding
complementarity variables. Note that in GAMS the sign is
replaced by a ‘.’. Thus the function deﬁned by
Prof(t).. is complementary to the variable R(t),
whereas the function deﬁned by Move(t) is
complementary to the variable S(t). It is important to
notice that only positive deﬁned variables can be made
complementary to inequalities or equations, whereas free
variables can only be made complementary to equations.
But it is not necessary to match free variables to equations;
it is only required to have the same number of equations
as free variables.13
Mathematically the following conditions have to hold:14
(0.38)
The function deﬁned by Prof(t).. speciﬁes that the
shadow price l(t) is no smaller than the difference
between marginal revenue (the price in the perfectly
competition case) and marginal costs. Equation
MoveL(t).. speciﬁes how the shadow price can change
over time. Finally, equation Move(t).. speciﬁes how the
extraction quantity R(t) relates to the stock of the
resource S(t). Note that the assignment of the starting
value of the resource stock cannot be done by ﬁxing the
value of S(0). By using
t0(t) = yes$(ord(t) eq 1),
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Figure 2. Market structures and ﬁrst-order conditionsthe logical value ‘yes’ is assigned to the label ‘1’ of set t0
(thus the value ‘yes’ is assigned to time period ‘1’). In the
function 
MoveS(t).. S0$t0(t) + S(t-1) -R(t) =e= S(t);
the scalar S0 (the initial stock) is added if the condition
t0(t) is true, i.e. the logical value of t0 is ‘yes’. Using
this procedure makes sure that the scalar representing the
initial stock S0 is only added in the ﬁrst period. In all
other periods only the equation S(t–1) –R(t) = e = S(t) has to
hold.
The only difference between the perfect competition case
and the monopoly case is in the ﬁrst-order condition: 
(0.39)
Compared to Figure 3 in the GAMS code only the function
deﬁned by Prof(t).. has to be changed:
Prof(t).. l(t)+ c =g= (a – 2*R(t))/b;
Now the marginal revenue of the monopolist is no longer
identical to the demand function. The monopolist takes
into account his inﬂuence on market price and it is well
known that the slope of the marginal revenue function is
twice that of the inverse demand function.
Somewhat more elaborate than the monopoly case is the
formulation of the Nash–Cournot equilibrium. The
complete GAMS code is shown in Figure 4. An additional
set i representing the individual players is introduced 
(in this case player 1 and player 2) and consequently
initial stocks, marginal extraction costs and discount rates
have to be deﬁned individually for each player. Variables
R(i,t), S(i,t) and l(i,t) are also deﬁned over the
set i. The Nash–Cournot case as an mcp is deﬁned as
follows:
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Figure 3. Competitively organised market as an mcp in GAMS
Sets
t time period /1*50/
t0(t) time period subset;
Parameter
price(t) price in period t;
Scalars
a demand at zero price /80/
b absolute slope of demand /0.2/
c marginal extraction costs /3/
S0 initial stock at t0 /500/
z discount rate /0.05/;
Variable
l(t) shadow price at time t;
Positive Variables
R(t) extracted quantities at time t
S(t) stock at time t;
Equations
Prof(t) proﬁt condition
MoveS(t) movement of stock
MoveL(t) movement of shadow price;
Prof(t).. l(t)+c =g= (a - R(t))/b;
MoveL(t).. l(t) + z*l(t) =g= l(t+1);
MoveS(t).. S0$t0(t) + S(t-1) -R(t) =e= S(t);
t0(t) = yes$(ord(t) eq 1);
Model competition /prof.r, movel.s, moves/;
Solve competition Using MCP;
price(t) = (a - R.l(t))/b;
Display price, r.l, s.l, l.l;(0.40)
The individual shadow prices l(i,t) for each player are
deﬁned in equation Prof(i,t).. and are not only
dependent on the individual extraction quantities of player
i, but on the extracted quantities of all players
sum(j,R(j,t)). The set j is assigned to the set i by
using the Alias statement. Now the close connection
between the three different market structures can be
shown. If only one player is deﬁned in the set i, the
term sum(j,R(j,t)) changes into R(j,t) so that the
function deﬁned by Prof(i,t).. changes into:
Prof(i,t).. l(i,t)+c(i) =g= (a - R(j,t) - 
R(i,t)) /b;
Because sets i and j are identical, we have the results
of the monopoly case. 
Now consider the assumption of many identical players in
the perfect competition case. The quantities extracted by a
single player R(i,t) in relation to the sum of the
quantities extracted by all players sum(j,R(j,t)) is very
small, i.e. the quantities of an individual player do not
have any measurable inﬂuence on the shadow price. The
function deﬁned as
Prof(i,t).. l(i,t)+c(i) =g= (a-sum(j,R(j,t))-
R(i,t)) /b;
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Figure 4. Two-player Nash–Cournot equilibrium as an MCP in GAMS
Sets
t time period /1*50/
t0(t) time period subset













a demand at zero price /80/
b absolute slope of demand /0.2/
Variables
l(i,t) shadow prices
p(t) price in t
Positive Variables
R(i,t) extracted quantities of player i at t
S(i,t) stock of resource of player i at t
Equations
Prof(i,t) proﬁt condition
MoveL(i,t) movement of shadow prices
MoveS(i,t) movement of stocks
Price(t) demand function;
Prof(i,t).. l(i,t)+c(i) =g= (a-sum(j,R(j,t))-R(i,t)) /b;
MoveL(i,t).. l(i,t) + z(i)*l(i,t) =g= l(i,t+1) ;
MoveS(i,t).. S0(i)$t0(t) + S(i,t-1) - R(i,t) =e= S(i,t) ;Price(t).. p(t) =e= (a
- sum(i, R(i,t)))/b;
Model Oligopoly /prof.r, MoveL.s, MoveS, Price/;
t0(t) = yes$(ord(t) eq 1);Solve Oligopoly Using MCP;
Display r.l, s.l, l.l, p.l;can then be restated as 
Prof(i,t)..l(i,t)+c(i) = g = (a - sum(j,R(j,t)) )
/b;
without changing the outcome. Because of (0.14), this is
the perfect competition case as stated in Figure 3.
The following function is used to determine the market
price:
Price(t).. p(t) = e = (a - sum(i, R(i,t)))/b;
The variable p(t) is unbounded and therefore must not
be matched to an equation in the model statement. Thus
the market price is determined residually from the sum of
the extracted quantities by using the demand function
(0.13).15
Note that in contrast to the non-linear program, the results
of the model cannot be checked by observing the
development of marginal rents with respect to time. This
development is explicitly speciﬁed in the mcp. As a
consequence of this, the solution will always follow this
rule, irrespective of errors in the ﬁrst-order conditions. An
error in the derivatives of the Hamiltonians, for example,
can lead to an unobserved error in the results if GAMS is
able to compute a feasible solution, because marginal rent
will nevertheless grow with the discount factor. Therefore
the determination of ﬁrst-order conditions and their
implementation as mcp in GAMS has to be done with great
care.
Summary
This paper has shown an alternative method to formulate
dynamic non-linear programs. Mixed complementarity
problems have been presented and the formulation of
non-linear programs as mixed complementarity problems
has been described. By means of three different models of
exhaustible resource markets (perfect competition,
monopoly and Nash–Cournot equilibrium) the
transformation of non-linear programs as complementarity
problems has been shown and their implementation in
GAMS described. Once the mixed complementarity
formulation is developed the implementation in GAMS has
proved rather straightforward. It has been shown that the
complementarity formulation is a powerful tool for
implementing and solving models of exhaustible natural
resource markets in GAMS. 
Notes
* The helpful comments and suggestions of Eric Meyer,
Alexander Smajgl and Valerie Böhner are gratefully
acknowledged.
1 A lot of information about GAMS can be found at
www.gams.com.
2 See the extensive information at www.ampl.com.
3 At the beginning of the 1980s, GAMS was originally developed
to support economists at the World Bank in the quantitative
analysis of policy scenarios. Linear programming was the
standard approach to economic modelling at that time and,
not surprisingly, solution algorithms for mainly this type of
mathematical problems were developed. As in the following
years the spectrum of available solution methods broadened,
lots of (not only) economic problems became solvable –
especially non-linear (nlp), integer (ip), mixed integer (mip)
and mixed integer non-linear problems (minlp). It was not
until the middle of the 1990s that solution algorithms were
developed for complementarity problems (cp) and mixed
complementarity (mcp) problems respectively. Mixed
complementarity problems are sometimes also called
‘generalised complementarity problems’. See in detail Billups
et al. (1997) and Dirkse and Ferris (1995).
4 See Ferris and Munson (2000).
5 See, for example, Ferris and Sinapiromsaran (2000) and
Billups and Murty (1999).
6 See Kuhn and Tucker (1951). An extensive and excellent
presentation can be found in Chiang (1984), S. 722 ff.
7 Markets of exhaustible resources have been analysed by a lot
of authors; see, for example, Hotelling (1931), Hoel (1978),
Dasgupta and Heal (1979), Hartwick (1989) and Conrad (1999).
8 Although the model is subsequently implemented in GAMS by
using a discrete-time approach, the underlying economic
basics are presented in a continuous time format in this
section. This is done as the continuous time formulation is
much more common in economic literature and the discrete
time formulation would not lead to any different results in this
rather simple context.
9 The open-loop Nash–Cournot equilibrium on markets for
exhaustible resources is extensively discussed in economic
literature; see, for example, Salant (1976), Ulph and Folie
(1980), and Lewis and Schmalensee (1980).
10 The problem of time inconsistency is extensively discussed in
Newbery (1981).
11 The PATH solver is used to calculate the model results.
12 There is no need to calculate the price by using a parameter
as it is done in Figure 3. It can also be calculated by using a
variable, but this variable would not be part of the underlying
mcp. Calculating the price by a variable is shown in the
Nash–Cournot case in Figure 4.
13 See Ferris and Munson (2000), p. 10.
14 In discrete-time formulation.
15 In contrast to Figure 3 the market price is calculated by an
equation and not by an assignment of a parameter after the
model is solved. It is self-evident that the model becomes
(much) larger, but in this case the formulation is presented as
an alternative solution method for academic purposes only.
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